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Abstraet 
This paper characterizes the role of capital and labor mobillty in the shifting 
of capital laxes in Harberger-type 2X2 general-equilibrium model with 
partially-mobile factors. We rust provide and examine an intuitive 
decomposition of the incidence of a selective capital Iax into a "specificity 
effect" and a "mobillty effect". Then we extend Harberger's incidence 
theorems lo a partially-mobile factors context. The relevance of factor 
mobility differentials is examined. We also show that a surprising number of 
elements of Harberger's theorems carry over in the partially-mobile-factors 
model. 
1. INTRODUCTION: TAXATION AND FACTOR MOBll..1TY 
It has long been recognized that the flexibilityand the nature of the responses of an 
economy to policy shocks depend crucially on the degree of mobility of its primary factors 
of production. In general equilibrium models used to study the comparative static effects of 
exogenous perturbations, the assumptions concerning wbich factors are intersectorally mobile 
,p, 
and wbich are sector specific are often critica1 to the results. 
The distributional impact of!Jo tariff imposed by a small open economy offers a well-
known example. Under perfect factor mobility, if the protected sector is relatively labor-
intensive, labor in both the protected and the non-protected sectors should favor the tariff, 
whereas capital-owners should oppose it (Sto1¡'ler and Samue1son, 1941). Now suppose thal 
labor is immobile. In Ibis setting, the tariff rises the- real wage in the protected sector and 
lowers it in the rest of the economy, irrespective of factor intensities in production (Jones, 
1971). Imperfect mobility implies a conflict of inlerests between labor in the Iwo sectors. 
Abandoning Ihe assumption of peri.;:ct mobility canalso dramatically affect the 
distributional incidence implications of tax foli~y. The case of a selective capital income tax 
(SCIT) is revea1ing1• Just over thirty years ago, Harberger (1962) analyzed the incidence of 
a SCIT in a simple 2x2 general-equilibrium model with perfect factor mobility. The 
Harberger model has since become the standard tool of incidence analysis. In tbis model, the 
introduction of a SCIT in one sector drives a wedge betwecn the returns lo capital in the two 
industries. The taxed sector will tend to suh~titute labor for relatively expensive capital, thus 
making capital owneIS worse-off. At t..ie same time, hl)wever, as production of the taxed 
industry falls, the wage-rental ratio ri~es (falls) if the taxed industry is capital-(labor) 
intensive. The overall effect of SCIT upon the wage-r~ntal ratio is "a priori" ambiguous. 
Harberger' s analysis has been extended in many directions. The assumption of perfect 
factor mobility has been relaxed in a numbel of papers (for examp1e, McLure, 1971; Ralti 
and Shome, 1977; Bhatia, 1989). These extellsions posit the existence of a fixed (or a quasi-
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fixed) factor. In this context, if capital is immobile a SCIT will be borne by the owners of 
the taxed capital, regardless factor substitucion and factor intensities. On the other hand, 
when capital is perfectIy mobile and labor is sector-specific, the rental to capital falls (rises) 
if the elasticity of technicaI substitution is greater (smaller) than the elasticity of demand for 
the good produced by the taxed industry. Surprisingly, this sharp contrast in conclusions has 
not been followed by any attempt to explain systematically the relationship between factor 
mobility and tax shifting. 
The need to reconcile these very different resuIts is important from a policy 
perspective. Imperfect mobility is a "fact of life". Further, if one adheres to the notion that 
mobility increases over time2, tax policy involves time horizons in which factors cannot be 
assumed to be perfectIy mobile or completely immobile. Rather, a more sensible choice 
would be a time frame so short that factor supplies do not change, but long enough to allow 
market clearing, for any degree of factor mobility. The objective of this paper is to 
characterize the role of mobility in the shifting process in a Harberger-type model with 
partially-mobile factors (section 2). In order to do this, we rust provide and examine an 
intuitive decomposition of the incidence of the SCIT into· a "specificity effect" and a 
"mobilityeffect" (sections 3 and 4). The second part of the paper derives resuIts about tax 
incidence. Qur purpose is to assess the generality of Harberger's incidence theorems when 
factors are partially mobile (sections 5 and 6). The last section summarizes the main 
conclusions (section 7). 
2. THE MODEL3 
Consider a closed economy that produces two rmal commodities, Xl and X2, using 
homogeneous capital, K, and labor, L. Technologies are CRS. Under competition, the 
behavior of producers is completely described by the equality of price and average cost: 
(1) 
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(2) 
where pis the relative prlce of Xl in tenns of Xz (numéraire), el (i=I,2) is the unít-cost 
function with the standard properties, '1 and WI are the oet rewards of capital and labor, and 
TIa =1 +tIa, where tIa is a selective liad valorem" tait on capital used in sector 1. 
Capital and labor are imperfecUy mobile. In our context of homogeneous factors, 
immobility can arise from two main sources". First, factor movemeots may be inhibitcd by 
physical barriers, govemment restrlctions or uníon pressures. Second, factors' may be 
"preferential1y specific", a situation in which a factor prefers being employed in a particular 
sector rather that being hired in the other industry (see l.aocaster, 1958, Manning and Sgro, 
1975, or Casas, 1984). Reluctancy to shift among occupations gives rise to a premium paid 
out to the factor employed in Ihe least preferred sector. Suppose, for instance, that 
preferences are additive in goods and factors, i.e. U:"UO(XI,X.j-UF(LI,Lz,KI,K.j. Further, 
assume that UF is a CES function of the form~ 
O<p<l, O<~<l, 
where 'I/¡ (I:K,L), p and ~ are constlltlts. Maximization of U subject to 
pX¡+Xz:sw¡L¡+wJ.z+r¡K¡+rzKz with respect lo LI and KI yields Ihe following first order 
conditions: 
(3) 
(4) 
where 'I/¡ (I:K,L) is the relative supply elasticity of the j-th factor to sector 1 with respect to 
3 
the net earnings ratio. The degree of factor mobility is given by '11: for an arbitrary change 
in the rental ratio, the sire of the reallocation of factor j across industries increases with the 
magnitude of 'l/J' Mussa (1982) and Grossman (1983) derive mobility conditions analogous 
to (3)-(4) in models of heterogeneous factors of production. 
Full employment of factors is ensured by perfect flexibility of factor returns: 
(5) 
(6) 
where the terms in the left-hand side are factor demands. Total factor supplies are fIXed. 
Equations (5)-(6) -which state that the total supply of a factor equals the sum of the quantities 
of that factor demanded by both sectors- do not imply that there is a single market for 
factors. Although frrms demand factors of production which are homogeneous, imperfect 
mobility may lead to an equilibrium featured by wI ;o! w2 and 'I;o! '2' i.e. the equilibrium rental 
rates may differ across sectors. The markets for LI and L2 (K¡ and K2) are not completely 
separated except when labor (capital) is immobile. 
Preferences over goods are represented by a single homothetic utility function. 
Aggregate demand for XI is: 
XI = XI(P,l) (7) 
where 1=pXI +X2• This defmition ofincome is valid when the SClT is "small" and revenues 
are returned back to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. In equillbrium, Walras' Law allows 
to ignore the demand function for X2• 
In order to analyze the incidence of taxation, the model can be solved for the change 
in factor prices using the convenient properties of the by now standard Jones' algebra (see 
Jones, 1965, and Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). This approach allows to express the rate of 
change of a variable as a function of the tax and a set of parameters that characterize the 
behavior of the economy: the elasticities of technical factor substitution, 0"/;. the elasticities 
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of factor mobility, '7J; the compensated elasticity of demand for Xl> -e; the shares in the total 
supply of factor j of the amount of this factor employed in sector ¡, }Y/; and the shares of the 
j-th factor in the value of the ¡-th product, Oj/' A circumflex over a variable indicates a 
proportional rate of change: f=dlogz .. 
Differentiating totally (1)-(7) and noting the aboye definitions of parameters, the 
incidence of a SCIT upon '/ can be expressed ass: 
with I E I = '7L'7)::A+l/LEB+l/)::e+ulu2e 
O = AOKle-5I u1 
EA = e9A+5I ul +52u2 
EB = ALl0K2ule+AL2u2(OL/ul +O/(/e) 
Ee = A/(/0L2ule+AK2u2(O/(/ul +OLle) 
where the short-hand expressions used aboye are: A=ALI-A/(/=AK2-AL2' 9=OLl-OL2=0K2-0/(/, 
5/=AK2AL/O/(/+A/(/AL20Ll and 52=AK2AL2' Factor j is perfecUy mobile (completely immobile) 
as l/roo (l/J=O). Sector 1 is said to be relatively labor-intensive in the physical (the value) 
sense if A (9»0. At an initial equilibrium, A9>0 ensures stability (see Neary, 1978). 
In order to understand the results in the paper, it is crucial to note that we are not 
assuming that the existence of an intersectoral difference in, say, wage rates will induce a 
transfer oí labor. This postulate superimposes a dynamic argument on a static analytical 
framework. Further, it implicitly identifies the long-run equilibrium with a situation of 
perfect factor mobility6. Rather, we assume that whatever the initial wage rates in the two 
sectors, a change in the ratio w¡lw2 is required to induce a movement of labor across 
industries. This movement will come to an end, with the size of the reallocation determined 
by the change in W¡lW2' The new equilibrium will be stable even though it may involve 
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different wage rates in the two sectors. 
3. THE SPECIFICITY AND THE MOBILITY EFFECTS OF A SCIT 
Here we aim at an expression that separates the incidence of the tax upon impact from 
the general equilibrium effects that take place once factors are allowed to move in response 
to the tax. To do this, we can reexpress (8) as: 
(9) 
where the specificity effect (superscript S) is the tax induced response of r¡ if capital were 
immobile, and the mobility effect (superscript M) represents the portion of the tax that capital 
in sector 1 succeeds in passing on to other factors of production through mobility. 
Trivially, with l1IFO, f'f = -7/a ,Le. r¡ falls by the amount of the tax. Subtracting 
from (8), the mobility effect can be written as: 
(10) 
where TIA=OKlOL2eA+O/Cla¡0"¡+a20"2 and TIB=0"2A/Cl(O/a0"¡+OLle). A necessary condition for any 
shifting to take place is that capital be mobile. On the other hand, equation (10) indicates that 
the degree of labor mobility largely determines the proportion of the tax that is shifted. The 
link between mobility and shifting that the former decomposition establishes is best 
characterized in two main results: 
Propositjon l. Sliffic/ent. condltions jor capital In sector 1 to bear less than the foil 
burden ojthe tax, I.e. f'f>o, are: (1) A'<!O, jor all l1K>O, l1L>O, and (ii) l1L=O, jor all 
l1K> O. 
Suppose that e=O initially. Then, as labor is substituted for capital at a fixed level of 
output of X¡, the net retum to capital will start to rise. If we now allow e ;éO, an additional 
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factor intensity differential effect will further encourage shifting when A;é O by creating an 
economy-wide excess demand for the factor intensively used in the untaxed sector as industry 
1 cuts down production. Result (U), rust proved by McLure (1971) for 1/¡[+co, emerges as 
a special case when the factor intensity differential does not play any role. Provided that X2 
is not produced by means of a Leontief-type technology, capital in sector 1 always gains 
from mobility when labor is sector-specific. 
Is it possible that capital in sector 1 actually loses from mobility when trying to 
escape the tax? Under the assumption of perfect capital mobility, capital may end up bearing 
more than the full amount of the tax (Harberger, 1962). Equation (10) indicates that this 
cannot occur when any factor is immobile. This implies that although mobility is necessary 
for any shifting to be possible, it is not sufficient to improve the position of capital owners. 
Proposit/on 2. Necessary conditions jor capital in sector 1 to bear more that the full 
burdenoj the tax, i.e. f~ <O , are that both jactors be mobile and that sector 1 be 
relatively capital-intensive. These, together with either: (i) E-+OO and 112=0, or (ii) E-+CO and 
1/L-+ CO , or (iii) 111-+0 and 112-+0, suffice to ensure a negative mobiliry effect. 
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that analyses of tax incidence based upon the specific-
factors model (1/¡=0) could yield misleading results when capital and/or labor are in fact 
partially mobile. According to this intuition, which is confirmed by the remaining results in 
the paper, if the degree of factor mobility is positive but "small", both the size and the sign 
of the mobility effect could be substantially different from those associated to the immobility 
benchmark. 
4. TAX SHIFI'ING UNDER INCREASED MOBILITY 
The available literature on tax incidence has neglected the analysis of the effects of 
changes in the degree of mobility upon tax shifting. This is not surprising, since the existing 
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models can be derived as speciaI cases of (1)-(7) when 1/) is either O or oo. From equation 
(10), we can obtain: 
(11) 
(12) 
Expressions (11) and (12) indicate how the incidence pattern of a SCIT is modified 
as a result of an exogenous change in mobility conditions. Suppose that these can be modified 
by government policy. Since I1n is non-negative, the qualitative effect of changes in factor 
mobility upon tax shifting depends on the sign of I1A• Capital in sector 1 will favor policies 
intended to increase capital mobility when I1A > O (industry 1 relatively labor-intensive or 
even "moderately" capital-intensive) and oppose those intended to increase the mobility of 
labor when I1A <O (industry 1 "highly" capital-intensive). From Proposition 2 we know that 
the mobility effect may be harmful for capital in sector 1 only if this industry is relatively 
capital-intensive and there are no immobile factors. When a negative factor intensity 
differentiaI effect dominates, owners of capital in sector 1 wiII favor policies to reduce its 
impact. Restrictions on labor mobility wiII a1ways do the jobo The case for an increase in 
capital mobility is just symmetric. 
It is worth noting that when factor substitution elasticities in both industries are zero, 
tax shifting becomes independent of factor mobility considerations. Capital in sector 1 gains 
(loses) relative to the immobility benchmark as e> ( <) O. This Harberger-type resuit -which 
is in the flavor of resuit 7 in Bhatia (1989)- generaIizes to situations featured by any degree 
of factor mobility, provided that no factor is completely "tied" to its sector of employment 
(Le. 1/j > O). 
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5. TAX INCIDENCE ANO AGGREGATE FACTOR SHARES (1): 
PROPORTIONAL BURDEN PROPOSITIONS 
We now tum to the issue of the incidence of taxation upon the functional distribution 
of income. How the burden of the SCIT will be shared between capital and labor as a whole 
when both factors are partially mobile? In the Harberger world, this question is analyzed 
in a very simple fashion. Under the assumption of perfect factor mobility, if labor is chosen 
as the numéraire, we just need to focus on the values taken by P. Clearly, P=O implies that 
capital and labor bear the tax in proportion lo their initial shares in national income. On the 
other hand, capital as a whole will bear the entire burden of the tax if P=-AKlT Kl : the retum 
to capital falls by the amounl of Ihe revenue from the tax on capital in sector 1. 
Taking these two situations as benchmark cases, Harberger (1962, 227-230) presented 
and proved ten celebrated theorems, each highlighting how demand, substitution and factor 
intensities determine the final incidence of the corporate tax. Despite of its well-known 
shortcomings -esentially those of the standard 2 x2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model of 
intemational trade theory-, the Harberger model remains as the basic workhorse for 
applications in (he theory of tax inciden ce. How partial mobility modifies Harberger results? 
The notion of aggregate burden borne by a factor can be made explicil by stating the 
following definition: 
Definition 1. Capital and labor bear the tax in proportion to their in/t/al shares in 
national /ncome if 
(13) 
Using the standard procedure of normalizing all the inilial prices lo unity, equation 
(13) can expanded as: 
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(14) 
In order to solve equation (14) we need expressions for the rates of change in r2, W¡, W2 and 
p. These are readily obtained as (see Appendix): 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
It is now a straightforward matter to derive and explicit expression for the distributional 
coefficient y: 
(19) 
the tax, in proportion to its initial share in national income, as '1'« > )0. 
We can now set out a generalized version of Harberger's first theorem by using 
equation (19) to establish 
PrODosition 3: Necessary conditions lor labor to bear a greater burden 01 the 
tax, in proportion to its initial share in national income, than capital, are: (i) A> O, or 
(U) E> (1/1 lor all fI,> O (j: L,K). 
When both factors are partially mobile, it is no longer sufficient that the tilxed sector 
be relatively capital-intensive for capital to bear a higher burden.· Indeed, if labor is 
sufficientIy tied to its sector of employment, capital might improve its position vis-a-vis labor 
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despite of the fact that the taxed industry be relatively capital-intensive. A high degree of 
labor specificity tends to minimize the impact of the factor intensity differential (beneficial 
to labor in both industries), and makes it possible that labor in sector 1 loses so much that 
labor's share in national income falls. This can occur only if the elasticity of demand for X¡ 
is large enough relative to the elasticity of factor substitution in the taxed sector. This 
reasoning establishes that condition (t) is no longer necessary -as in Harberger' s first 
theorem- if (ii) holds, and viceversa. As a limiting case of the aboye result, equation (19) 
implies the following proposition, which we state without further comments: 
Proposition 4: When labor is sector-speclfic, labor as a whole will bear a 
smaller burden of the tax, in proponion to its tnitial share in nattonal income, than capital, 
if (]¡;;a E, for all 1JK> O. On the other hand, only if E > (]¡ can labor bear the greater burden. 
Harberger's theorems 2 and 3 carry over unmodified in the partially-mobile-factors 
mode!. According to these, if the elasticity of factor substitution in sector 1 is as great of 
greater than the elasticity of demand for the taxed product -the elasticity of substitution in . 
demand between X¡ and X2 in theorem 3-, capital must bear a greater burden of the tax. 
Using our model, wejust have to show that 0<0 and "'>0 when (]¡;;aE7• Let (]¡=E=K. Then 
it can be shown that O collapses to -AKlAL2K<0. Trivially, (]¡;;aE implies "'>0. Interestingly 
enough, this result holds for any positive degree of factor mobility, thus providing a nice 
generalization of the perfect mobility result. 
Theorems 4 and 5, however, do not carry over in the general case. The latter is only 
applicable to the perfect mobility case, since it refers to "the" post-tax rate of retum to 
capital. Theorem 4 establishes that the higher is the elasticity of factor substitution in the 
untaxed sector, the greater will be the tendency for labor and capital to bear the tax in 
proportion to their respective initial income shares. As (]2 goes to 00 lim'lt=O only under 
special circumstances. One such case is Harberger's perfect mobility scenario. When factors 
are imperfectIy mobile, the proportional burden result will hold if both (]¡ and E are close to 
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zero, or when u ¡ =0 and both the intensity differential (A) and the factor mobility dlfferential 
(7lK7lU tend to zero. 
The last of Harberger's propositions stated in proportional-burden terms refers to the 
fued coefficients case (theorem 8): when U¡=U2=0, labor will bear more of the tax than in 
proportion to its initial income share when the taxed industry is relatively labor-intensive. 
From equation (19) it can be seen that tbis proposition cardes over unmodified: 
'l' = (KIL)(O/(}/9) > «) O as 9 > «) O, for all 7lL>O, 7lK>O (20) 
An interesting advantage of explicitly introducing imperfect factor mobility in the 
Harberger framework is that it allows to analyze the role offactor mobility dlfferentials upon 
the distributional incidence of a SCIT. This is perhaps best iIIustrated by the following 
ProDosition 5: The elasticity of factor substitution in the taxed sector is uro, 
the mobility dlfferential (7lKr¡J and the factor intensity dlfferential (A) jointly determine which 
factor will bear a greater burden of the tax, in pro portian lo its initial share in national 
income. In particular, for all 7lL> O, r¡K> O: (i) if r¡K=r¡L' 'l' '2: «)0 as A '2: «)0, (ti) if 
A=O, 'l' '2: «)0 as r¡K'2: «)r¡L' and (iii) if r¡K> «)r/Land A '2: «)0, 'l' '2: «)0. 
There is nothing comparable to proposition 5 in the Iiterature on tax incidence. In 
order to c1arify tbe intuition behind these results, notice that if U¡ =0 we have: 
(21) 
When both factors are equally mobile, all that matters is the factor intensity differential 
effect, which influences the returns to homogeneous factors in the same direction, regardless 
the particular industry that employs them. The Harberger model is a particular case in which 
result (1) applies. On the other hand, result (ii) states that when both industries use identical 
factor proportions, the distributional outcome hinges upon the sign of the factor mobility 
differential: capital owners gain relative to labor if capital is more mobile across industries 
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than labor, and viceversa. Once we allow for differences in factor intensities, we can be sure 
of the distributional outcome only if both the factor intensity differential and the factor 
mobility differential influence the wage-rental ratio in the same direction. Thus, when sector 
1 is labor-intensive and capital is more mobile than labor, capital bears the tax less than in 
proportion to its income share, and viceversa. Hence result (ili). Incidentally, notice that 
since factor substitution does not operate in the taxed industry, proposition 5 provides a 
generalization of Mieszkowski's (1967) ,"output effect" of a SCIT. 
An interesting extension of the aboye, which also holds a fortiori from proposition 
4, is now stated without proof in the forro of 
Provositlon 6: If labor is sector specific ami the taxed sector employs ajixed-
proportions technology, (he tax will burden labor more than In proportlon (o i(s initial 
income share, for all UK> O. 
6. TAX INCIDENCE AND AGGREGATE FACTOR SHARES (m: 
FULL BURDEN PROPOSITIONS 
In section 3 we derived conditions under which the owners of capital in sector 1 bear 
the full burden of the tax with the purpose of providing an intuitive interpretation of the 
shifting mechanism. Consider now the role that partíal mobility plays in the determination 
of the circumstances under which capital as a whole bears the full burden. Por analytical 
purposes, it will be useful to state the following 
Definitíon 2: Capital will bear (he full burden of the (ax if the income accruing to 
capital gross of/he lax in ratio lo total labor income remains unchanged, i.e. 
(22) 
If we notice that ~=~+(KIL)AK1' some manipulation of expression (19) yields: 
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where<l>i =A (hKlOK2+ AJKl)' <l>z = AKl (h¡}JK2H·JuJ, <1>3 = M,K2OK1 and<p4=AK2 (hL/0K1 + AKlOL/)' 
Notice that <l>z and <P4 are positive, whereas <p¡ and <P3 have the sign of A. 
* 
Unlike in the proportional-burden analysis above, a1l of Harberger's full-burden 
theorems carry over in the partíally-mobile factors model. Theorem 6 establishes that when 
the capital-labor ratio is the sarne in both industries, capital will bear the full burden of the 
tax if CI¡=ClZ and more (less) than the full burden when CI¡> «)Cl2' With partíal factor 
mObility, when A=O, the coefficient of r¡Lr¡K collapses to ALZAKlAK2(Clz-Cl¡). In addition, when 
factor proportions are equal the term in r¡K reduces to AK1AjZe(Clz-Cl¡), j:K,L. Hence the 
generalized proposition: 
(24) 
Theorem 7 in Harberger states that if the elasticity of demand for the good produced 
by the taxed industry is zero and CI¡ = Clz, capital will bear the full burden when the initial 
factor proportions are the same in both sectors, and more(less) that 100 per cent of the 
burden of the tax as A> «) O. Le! CI¡=Clz= t. Then equation (23) reduces to: 
(25) 
which proves that if CI¡=ClZ and e=O, 
(26) 
Much econometrlc evidence has found that the elasticities of substitution in production 
are close to 1. Further, empirical research often assumes that preferences over goods are 
homothetic, which implies that the elasticity of substitution in consumption between X¡ and 
Xz, e· (e·=-dlog(X/Y)/dlogp I .,J, equals 1. Thus, it is not surprising that Harberger's theorem 
9 is regarded as one of the most compelling results: capital will bear the full burden of the 
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tax when u¡=uz=e*=1. Theorem 10 simply generalizes the former for any positive values 
of Ul> Uz and e*, as long as u¡=uz=e*. Interestingly, we can prove that the former conditions 
imply that q, =0 for all ?1L> O, ?1K> O. 
First note that e = (X/'Z)e *, where XlZ is the initial share of good Xz in national 
income8. Consider now the sign of the coefficient in ?1L?1K in equation (23): 
(27) 
where normalization ofall initial prices to unity allow to write Z=X¡+X2, and 'Y=U¡ =uz=e*. 
Notice now that 
(28) 
and 
(29) 
Expressions (28) and (29) establish that the sign of (27) is zero. Thus, if theorem 10 is to 
carry over in the partially-mobile-factors case, the sign of the coefficient ?1K must be zero. 
In effect, 
(30) 
which completes the proof of the generalized theorem9• 
It may be useful to complete the analysis of full-burden results by stressing -the 
interaction between technical substitution, factor intensities and mobility. Some inspection 
of equation (23) leads to the following 
ProDositíon 7: For al! ?1K> O: (i) when u¡(u?J =0, capital will bear less (more) 
Ihan thejUll burden ofthe tax ifthe laxed industry is relatively labor-(capiial-)intensive,for 
all ?1L> 0, and (ii) when ?1L =0, if u¡(u?J=O capital wil! always bear less (more) Ihan thefull 
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burden of the tax. 
The results in proposition 7 reaffrrm the basic intuition of previous findings and 
complement propositions 2, 5 and 6: capital mobility is a necessary condition for any shifting 
to be possible, but it does not suffice to ensure that the mobility effect will improve the 
position of capital owners. In the absence of factor substitution possibilities in the untaxed 
sector or when the taxed industry is capital-intensive, the reduction in net capital earnings 
could well exceed the amount of the tax. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The thirty years following the appearance of Harberger's model have been the most 
fruitfulones in both the theoretical and the empirical development of tax incidence analysis. 
Despite its obvious limitations, this model remains as the simplest, yet rigurous analytical 
tool for examining incidence issues in general equilibrium. In the Harberger' s model, the 
assumption of perfect factor mobility plays a crucial role in the shifting process: factor taxes 
are shifted as factors move across industries in response to earnings differentials. Subsequent 
extensions have introduced the assumption of factor specificity, which has caused dramatic 
changes in results about incidence. SUrPrisingly, this sharp contrast in conclusions has not 
been followed by attempts to explain systematically the relationship between factor mobility 
and tax shifting. 
The primary metodological objective of this paper has been to clarify and characterize 
the role of factor mobility in the shifting process in a Harberger-type model with partially-
mobile factors. Three features of the analysis are noteworthy. First, the relationship between 
the shifting possibilities of a selective factor tax and the mobility conditions of the economy 
has been explicitly examined with the help of the intuitive notion of the "mobility effect". 
Use of this concept has enabled us to establish propositions that explain the degree of success 
of the taxed factor in passing on the tax burden to other factors of production in terms of the 
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relative factor intensities and the degrees of mobility of capital and labor. Second, the 
analysis has shown that when capital and labor are partially mobile, the incidence of a SCIT 
hinges upon the factor mobility differential. The sign of Mieszkowski's "output effect" 
depends on1y upon the difference in factor intensities -as in the perfect mobility scenario-
when capital and labor are equally mobile. However, if the two industries have the same 
capital-labor ratio, capital owners gain (relative to the "proportional burden" benchmark) if 
capital is more mobile across industries than labor, and viceversa. 
Third, sections 5 and 6 have demonstrated that when incidence analysis focuses upon 
aggregate factor shares, the assumption of perfect factor mobility is unnecessarily restrictive. 
Although Harberger's fundamental proposition (theorem 1) hasto be modified when mobility 
is imperfect -the fact that the taxed industry be relatively labor-intensive is no longer 
necessary for labor to bear the tax more Ihan in proportion lo labor' s share in nalional 
income-, most of Harberger Iheorems remain valid for any positive degrees of mobility of 
capital and labor. Furthermore, the previous results show how stringent is incidence analysis 
based upon the specific-factors approach. When capital is immobile, capital owners bear the 
full burden of the tax. However, if the degree of capital mobility is positive but arbitrarily 
"small" , capital' s share in the burden could be even smaller than its share in national income. 
These findings are relevant not jusI in terms of their generality but also because they 
help to illuminate the nature of the relationship between tax shifting and factor mobility. In 
most instances, despite of the exislence of rental differentials, the incidence of the tax upon 
aggregate factor shares when factors are partially mobile is qualitatively the same as in the 
perfect mobility case. This implies that Ihe basic role of mobility is to determine the 
distribution of the burden between homogeneous factors employed in different sectors. To 
sum up, as regards lo the robustness of its main implications in a partially-mobile-factors 
context, the Harberger model can still be praised as an attractive and convenient 
simplification for tax incidence analysis. 
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Notes 
The analysis extends trivially to selective labor income taxes (e.g. payroll taxes), selective employment incentives 
(e.g. exemptions in social security contributions) and selective capital subsidies (e.g. industrial promotion sehemes). 
2 Section 2 briefly deals with this issue. 
, The basic structure of the model foUows the standard general equilibrium model of international trade thenry as 
fonnulated by Jones (1965). For applications to tax incidence in general equilibrium, see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) . 
• In heterogeneous faeton models, immobility can aiso stem from "aptitudinal specificity", a situation in which a 
factor is more efficient in producing a good rather than analber. Even if, say, capital is instantaneously transferable between 
sectors I capital would be imperfectly mobile if different capital units contribute differentIy to the stock of lIefficiency capital" 
(see Mussa, 1982, or Grossman, 1983). 
Algebraic treatment of general equilibrium models is a straightforward but tedious exercise even in the simple 2 X2 
model with perfect mobility. In our case, algebra is greaUy simplified if we note that (1) perfect competition and CRS 
implies: 
and that (2) the dermition of the elasticity of technic.1 substitution aUows to write: 
Once eliminated the rates ol change in X¡, Ki and Li , the model can be reduced to a three-equation system in the percentage 
changes in w/rl , w,Jr, and p. The solution of the system may be combined with the zero-protit conditions to yield form.1 
expressions for the tax-induced changes in factor prices (for detalls, see Appendix). 
6 This popular Marshallian assumption is controversial. Differences in preferences, in labor skills and in capital 
efficiency can be a feature oflong-run equilibrium (for example, see Herherg and Kemp, 1971, and Grossman and Shapiro, 
1982). Further, physical or legal restrictions that inhibit mobility can be long lasting. 
7 The elasticity of substitution in demand between XI and X, is always greater (in absolute value) than •. For a 
simple proof, differentiate the consumer budget constraint arid use the zero...<fegree homogeneity oí compensated demands. 
Thus, Harberger's theorem 3 is a simple corollary of theorem 2 . 
• This equivalence foUows from the proaf suggested in footnote 7. 
, The second !erm in brackets in equation (30) can expanded as: 
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K, [L,K, + L,K,] X, + K,K,!JZ _ K, [L,K, + L,K, ] X, 
K LX, KX, KX, K LX, KX, 
Noting that Xj =z..X21 this expression reduces to: 
From Ihe racls lhatZ=K+L and X,=L,+K" and using Ihe defmition of A, Ihe tenn in brackets beccmesZ(L,z-X¡"+K¡"-
L,)=Z(L,z-L¡"-L,K)=Z'(L,-L,)=O. 
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Appendix 
Derivatinn 01 equatinns (8), (15), (16), (17) and (18) 
Wejust need to reduce equations (1)-(7) to a three equation system in (*,-',), (*,-f,) and p. First, notice 
that the zero-profit conditions (1)-(2) imply: 
(A.t) 
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
(A.4) 
The fuU..,mployment equations (5)-(6) can be rewritten as: 
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(A.S) 
(A.6) 
Subtract (A.S) from (A.6) to gel: 
(A.7) 
From (A.S), l, = -(A,./AL,)l,. Substituting in equation (A.7) for Ihe mobility conditions (3)-(4) and using Ihe definition 
of 11, and equations (A.l)-(A.4), expression (A.8) becomes Ihe first equation of Ihe system: 
Thesecond equation is obtained as follows. The mobility condition (3) can berestated as l, = l,-QL(1!>,-1!>,). On 
Ihe other hand, perfect competition and CRS imply X, = 6LI-, +liJ, = l, +6K1(k,-l,). Thus, ifwe use Ihis result and the 
defmition of "" (A.5) becomes: 
(A.9) 
Using Ihe demand condition (7) and substituting for (1!>,-1!>,) from (A.l)-(A.2), we have: 
(A.IO) 
Analogous substitutions allow to rewrite equation (A.6) as: 
In arder to derive the incidence expression (8), we must salve: 
where ¡; is Ihe coefficient matrix of Ihe system (A.8), (A.I0)-(A.ll). Solutions for (1!>,-f,), (1!>,-f,) and pcon be 
combined with (A.l)-(A.4) 10 yield equations (8) and (15)-(18) in !he texto 
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